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CRIMINAL LAW-Federal Rule of Collateral Estoppel
Held to be Incorporated into the Double Jeopardy Clause
and Applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
On January 10, 1960, in the early morning hours, six men were
robbed while playing poker in the basement of a private home in Lee's
Summit, Missouri. Their assailants, three or four masked men armed
with a shotgun and pistols, took money and various items of personal
property from their victims, and then fled in a stolen car. The car was
recovered a short while thereafter, and three men on foot were arrested
by a Missouri state trooper in the vicinity of the abandoned vehicle.
Some distance away, Bob Fred Ashe was arrested by another officer.
All four men were subsequently charged with seven separate offenses:
the armed robbery of each of the six victims, and the theft of the car.
In May of 1960, Ashe was tried for the robbery of Donald Knight,
one of the six card players. The prosecution called Knight and three
fellow victims to testify to the circumstances of the holdup and their
losses. The defense did not cross-examine these witnesses concerning
the robbery itself or any losses resulting from it. Rather, an attack was
made only on the weaknesses of the testimony offered to identify Ashe
as a participant in the alleged crime. Two witnesses had thought there
were only three robbers, and they were not able to identify Ashe as one
of them. Another witness testified that he had positively identified
the other three suspects at the police station, but could say only that
Ashe's voice was very similar to that of one of the robbers. The fourth
witness for the state identified Ashe, but only by "his size, height, and
actions." After the close of its cross-examination, the defense de-
clined to offer testimony of its own, and waived final argument.
The trial judge instructed the jury that Ashe was guilty of robbery
if he had taken "any money" from Knight; and further, he was guilty
even if he had not personally robbed Knight, but had merely partici-
pated in the holdup. The jury, though not instructed to elaborate on
its findings, returned a verdict of "not guilty due to insufficient evi-
dence."
Six weeks later, Ashe was again brought to trial, this time charged
with the robbery of a different participant in the card game. The de-
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fendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the previous acquittal, but
this was denied. The only new testimony- offered at the second trial was
that of the wife of one of the victims. Further, one of the witnesses
whose identification testimony had been particularly weak in the first
trial was not called in the subsequent prosecution. The remaining wit-
nesses, however, were now able to offer additional testimony tending to
identify Ashe as a participant in the robbery. For instance, the two
men who previously had been completely unable to identify Ashe, now
stated that his features, size, and mannerisms were the same as those
of one of the robbers. Another witness now identified Ashe, not only
by his size and actions, but also by the peculiar sound of his voice.
The case went to the jury on instructions almost identical with those
of the first trial, and the defendant was found guilty.
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction,1 and a col-
lateral attack in the state courts some four years later was also un-
successful.2 Ashe next brought a habeas corpus proceeding in the
Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri, claiming
that the second trial had denied his constitutional right not to be put
twice in jeopardy. The District Court denied the writ' on the basis of
Hoag v. New Jersey,4 and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the same au-
thority.5
The facts in Hoag v. New Jersey were very similar to those in Ashe.
Hoag involved one criminal occurrence affecting multiple robbery vic-
tims. The only issue contested by the defendant at the trial for the rob-
bery of one of the victims, was his presence at the robbery. The jury re-
turned a verdict of not guilty. Subsequently Hoag was tried again on an
indictment charging him with the robbery of a second victim, and he was
found guilty. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the state
appellate and supreme courts.' Hoag appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States claiming a denial of due process on two grounds:
first, that the successive prosecutions by the state were actually for the
"same offense"; and second, that the state at the second trial failed to
apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 7  The Supreme Court, using
only the standards of Fourteenth Amendment due process, affirmed the
1. State v. Ashe, 350 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1961).
2. State v. Ashe, 403 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1966).
3. Ashe v. Swenson, 289 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
4. 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
5. Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968).
6. 35 N.J. Supra. 555, 114 A.2d 573 (1955); 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956).
7. Collateral estoppel, more commonly employed in a civil suit, precludes future
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conviction, holding that New Jersey's course of action in prosecuting
Hoag a second time was not "fundamentally unfair."' 8 The Court did not
find it necessary to decide whether collateral estoppel is a due process
requirement, having accepted New Jersey's determination that the doc-
trine was inapplicable in the particular case.
Despite the close factual similarity to Hoag, the Supreme Court in
Ashe v. Swenson9 reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, viewing the
issues from an entirely different constitutional perspective. Subsequent
to Hoag, the Court had held in Benton v. Maryland"° that the Fifth
Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the first question to be decided in Ashe did not
concern a possible denial of Fourteenth Amendment due process, as
in Hoag, but focused on whether the successive prosecutions had in
some way subjected the petitioner to double jeopardy in violation of his
Fifth Amendment rights.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart did not
disturb the holding in Hoag as to whether successive trials in such
multiple victim cases were for the "same offense." However, he did
conclude that the rule of collateral estoppel, well established in federal
law, is in fact an ingredient of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and is not a matter to be left for state determination within
the doctrine of "fundamental fairness."
Mr. Justice Stewart then considered what kind of test was to be em-
ployed in determining when to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
He concluded that where a former trial results in a general verdict of
acquittal, the test to be utilized based on an "examination of the record,
the pleadings, evidence, charge and other relevant matter,"" is whether
a rational jury could have reached its verdict upon any issue other than
that which the defendant seeks to preclude from consideration in a
subsequent trial. Applying this test with "realism and rationality", Mr.
Justice Stewart concluded that Ashe could have been acquitted at the
first trial only on the issue of identity, and that once that issue had been
decided in Ashe's favor, the prosecution was barred from litigating it
again.
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, con-
relitigation between two parties of an issue which has already been determined in
a trial in which those same parties had an interest.
8. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, at 467.
9. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
10. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
11. 397 U.S. at 453.
185
1971
Loyola University Law Journal Vol. 2: 183
curred in the result, but criticized the opinion of the Court as being too
limited in its practical application. He argued that the Double Jeopardy
clause not only embraces the doctrine of collateral estoppel, but also
requires that the prosecution join at one trial all charges against a de-
fendant which "grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode,
or transaction.'
'1 2
Mr. Justice Burger, on the other hand, dissented, claiming that there
is no authority for designating collateral estoppel an "essential ingredi-
ent" of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Further, assuming arguendo that
the states could be held to the doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal
cases, Mr. Justice Burger stated that the majority had violated its own
determinative test by assuming that the identity of Ashe was the only
issue on which the jury could have based its verdict. 13  Finally, Mr.
Justice Burger stated that the doctrine of collateral estoppel would in-
troduce a large element of confusion and conjecture into criminal cases,
and therefore was an inappropriate tool to use in the enforcement of
constitutional guarantees.
The opinion of the Court in Ashe is important as a further delineation
of the rights guaranteed under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The decision of the Court makes it clear that collateral
estoppel is a constitutional guarantee in criminal prosecutions, that it
applies to the states because of the decision in Benton v. Maryland,1 4
and that the states, in employing the doctrine, will be required to adhere
to federal standards. Collateral estoppel will be a substantial check
upon the prosecution's ability to subject a criminal defendant to several
trials for a single criminal act or episode. Ashe v. Swenson is also sig-
nificant for the discussions in the concurring and dissenting opinions
of a "one transaction rule." This rule was formulated with the pur-
pose of further protecting criminal defendants by more broadly defin-
ing "same offense" under the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause. Although the opinions on this issue do not have the force of
law, they do offer an important insight into the attitudes of members of
the Court concerning a rule which would provide additional safeguards
against the "harassment" of multiple trials. 'Under the facts in Ashe,
however, the majority did not need to consider the application of the
more broadly based "one transaction rule." Rather, it relied on a doc-
12. 397 U.S. at 453-54.
13. See J. Burger's factual distinction, 397 U.S. at 466-468.
14. See n. 8, supra. The Court in Benton made it clear that its decision in that
case would be retroactive.
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trine familiar in the federal courts for more than fifty years, collateral
estoppel.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION
Broadly defined, collateral estoppel is that doctrine which holds
that an issue of ultimate fact, once determined by a valid and final judg-
ment, cannot be relitigated between the same parties in a future law-
suit. Originally employed only in civil suits, the doctrine found its way
into a federal criminal proceeding in the case of United States v. Op-
penheimer." The Court granted defendant's motion to quash the in-
dictment in the first trial, ruling that the government's charges were
barred by the statute of limitations. In a subsequent but unrelated case,
however, this ruling was shown to be erroneous, whereupon the gov-
ernment reindicted Oppenheimer on the original charge. To the de-
fendant's contention that the charge in the second trial was res judicata
due to the successful plea in bar at the first prosecution, the govern-
ment responded that a Fifth Amendment defense was inapplicable be-
cause the case had never been before a jury, and thus jeopardy had
not attached. The Supreme Court, citing the English case The Queen
v. Miles,16 ruled that:
[W]here a criminal charge has been adjudicated upon by a court
having jurisdiction to hear and determine it, that adjudication,
whether it takes the form of an acquittal or conviction, is final as to
the matter so adjudicated upon, and may be pleaded in bar to
any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. . . . The
Fifth Amendment was not intended to do away with what in the
civil law is a fundamental principle of justice in order when a
man has been acquitted on the merits, to enable the Government
to prosecute him a second time. 17
It should be noted, although the opinion in Oppenheimer can be read
in such a way as to support the concept of collateral estoppel in criminal
cases, the case strictly concerns the doctrine of res judicata. The de-
fendant in the second trial was not trying to preclude the relitigation of
an issue which had been previously determined. Rather, he sought to
preclude the second trial itself on the ground that he was being charged
with the identical cause of action of which he had already been ac-
quitted. The situation was quite different from that presented in Ashe
15. 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
16. 24Q.B.D.423,431 (1890).
17. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 88 (1916).
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where the causes of action in each trial were different. Nevertheless,
numerous subsequent cases rely on Oppenheimer as authority for the
rule of collateral estoppel in criminal prosecutions. 18
United States v. DeAngelo 9 is one of the most lucid explanations of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. There the defendant was first tried
and acquitted of robbing a member bank of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, and subsequently was tried for conspiring to rob the same bank.
The United States attorney, in his opening remarks to the jury in the
second trial, stated that he would prove that the defendant committed
the overt acts constituting the conspiracy, and further, that the defendant
participated in the underlying substantive offense as well. Defense
counsel moved to set up the prior acquittal of the robbery as a defense,
but the trial judge denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court on the basis of the trial court's erroneous
preclusion of that defense, and said:
Even though there has been no former acquittal of the particular
offense on trial, a prior judgment of acquittal on related matters
has been said to be conclusive as to all that judgment determined.
[A] rule of evidence has been recognized which accords the ac-
cused the right to claim finality with respect to a fact or a group of
facts previously determined in his favor upon a previous trial.20
The Supreme Court in Sealfon v. United States2' accepted without
comment the contention that collateral estoppel applies to criminal pro-
ceedings, but made no effort to define the rule as procedural, eviden-
tiary or constitutional. It merely concluded that in the case at bar, peti-
tioner, previously acquitted of conspiring to defraud the United States,
could not be convicted of the underlying substantive offense, since the
central fact at issue in the conspiracy trial was also essential to the latter
prosecution. That central fact having been once found in the defend-
ant's favor, the prosecution was precluded from relitigating it at the
latter trial.
In United States v. Cowart,22 the rule was thus succinctly stated:
18. See United States v. Curzio, 170 F.2d 354 (3rd Cir. 1948); Sealfon v. United
States, 332 U.S. 575 (1947); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1956).
19. 138 F.2d 466 (3rd Cir. 1943).
20. United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d 466 at 468 (3rd Cir. 1943). In reaching
this decision the court relied on United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y.
1940). In Carlisi the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of conspiracy to
defraud the United States. The court held that such evidence was precluded from use
because it had been declared inadmissible (as fruits of an illegal search and seizure) in
the previous trial charging the substantive offense on which the conspiracy was based.
21. 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
22. 118 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1954).
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[T] o bar the litigation of an issue, the same issue must have
been determined favorably to the defendant, expressly or by nec-
essary implication, in a previous proceeding between the same
parties. 23
The phrase "determination . . .expressly or by necessary implica-
tion" in the Cowart decision is an important variation on the definition
of collateral estoppel, for it can be interpreted as permitting an element
of discretion in deciding upon what issue a verdict has been based.
Finally, the rule was reiterated by the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit in the case of United States v. Kramer:
The Government is free within the limits set by the Fifth Amend-
ment to charge an acquitted defendant with other crimes claimed
to arise from the same or related conduct; but it may not prove the
new charge by asserting facts necessarily determined against it on
the first trial. 24
Although the federal courts since Oppenheimer have defined and
applied collateral estoppel with a great deal of consistency, there has
been little or no analysis of the nature of the rule itself. The Court in
Oppenheimer admitted that it was borrowing a rule of procedure from
the civil courts, but it then implied a constitutional basis for collateral
estoppel by referring to it as a "fundamental principle of justice."'2 5
On the other hand, the decision in United States v. DeAngelo"6 refers
to collateral estoppel as a rule of evidence, which seems to indicate that
that court considered it something less than a constitutional guarantee as
implied in Oppenheimer. Most federal courts employing the rule, how-
ever, have avoided any attempt at categorization, contenting themselves
merely with a statement affirming the applicability of collateral estoppel
to criminal proceedings.
Nevertheless, the Court in Ashe concluded that collateral estoppel
is an essential ingredient of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. As Mr. Justice Burger points out in his dissent, it is diffi-
cult to find any solid case authority for this decision. Oppenheimer ap-
parently does provide some support for the Court's conclusion, but it
must be remembered that the Oppenheimer decision actually involved
res judicata rather than collateral estoppel. There are no case decisions
to be found that consider collateral estoppel a constitutional guarantee.
Moreover, the decision in United States v. Kramer,27 which applied
23. United States v. Cowart, 118 F. Supp. 903 at 906.
24. 289 F.2d 909, at 916 (2d Cir. 1961).
25. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 88.
26. See n. 20 supra.
27. See n. 24 supra.
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collateral estoppel, can be taken to imply that the rule is extrinsic to the
Fifth Amendment. There the court held that the government could
charge an acquitted defendant for other crimes which arose from the
same or related conduct, but only, if in doing so, no Fifth Amendment
rights were violated. But the court then additionally stated that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel would also apply at any subsequent trials.
It is arguable that the court in Kramer separately referred to Fifth
Amendment restrictions and collateral estoppel because it felt that the
latter simply was not a constitutional guarantee. Also, the Court in
Hoag stated that:
Despite its [collateral estoppel's] wide employment, we entertain
grave doubts whether it is a constitutional requirement. Cer-
tainly this Court has never so held. 28
One would have to assume that the Court was holding its "grave
doubts" with reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, for Hoag con-
cerned review of a state court decision prior to the decision in Benton
making the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states. Yet the lan-
guage in Hoag is not clear, and it is certainly possible that the Court's
comments in that case were intended to include the Fifth as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment. If this is so, then there is some support for
Mr. Justice Burger's claim in his dissent in Ashe that a rule of the fed-
eral courts has been elevated to the status of a constitutional guarantee.
Regardless of how compelling one may find Mr. Justice Burger's dis-
sent, it must be pointed out that among every other member of the Court
in Ashe there was substantial agreement that collateral estoppel is an
ingredient of the Fifth Amendment. At this point, then, it is appro-
priate to turn from a consideration of the history of collateral estoppel
at the federal level, to an examination of its effects upon criminal prose-
cutions in the state courts.
ASHE: IMPACT ON THE STATES
Before the Supreme Court, in Benton v. Maryland,29 decided that the
Fifth Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, state courts were allowed to handle the question of suc-
cessive prosecutions and double jeopardy within the limits set up by
their own constitutions and the fundamental fairness interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Nearly all states have
constitutional provisions which prohibit putting a man "twice in jeo-
28. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, at 471.
29. See n. 10 supra.
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pardy for the same offense." 30 Actually, a common law notion of dou-
ble jeopardy existed prior to the Eighteenth Century, but at that time,
and even when the Bill of Rights was adopted, there was no authorita-
tive definition of "same offense."31  Today most American jurisdictions
adhere to the "same evidence" test, first espoused in England in The
King v. Vandercomb & Abbott,32 and later adopted by the federal
courts. 3 In essence the rule is that where evidence required to sup-
port a second prosecution is different from that required to support the
first, a conviction or acquittal on the first indictment is no bar to the
second. The Supreme Court has never explicitly rejected this test as a
ground for initiating successive trials where multiple victims are in-
volved. 4 Nevertheless, the Federal Government has apparently never
used the test in such a manner, but rather has employed it as a tool to
prosecute a defendant for more than one offense arising from one trans-
action. However, it has always done so at the same trial.33
There are, on the other hand, numerous instances in which state
courts have engaged in successive prosecutions on the basis of this
same evidence test, and the Supreme Court in the past has affirmed
their actions. In Ciucci v. Illinois,3" a companion case to Hoag, the
Court decided that a defendant had not been denied due process by
being prosecuted in three successive trials for the murder of his wife and
two children. The first two trials resulted in penalties of imprisonment,
while at the third trial the defendant was given the death penalty. An-
other example is Johnson v. Commonwealth,37 where each of seventy-
five poker hands was considered a separate offense, and a second prose-
cution was allowed.
As cases involving multiple prosecutions by state courts have been
reviewed by the Supreme Court, they have been subjected to the stand-
ards of due process of the Fourteenth Amendment as enunciated by
Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut:
30. See, e.g., Ill. Const. art. II § 10 (1870).
31. See J. Brennan's discussion in Ashe, at 450-51.
32. 2 Leach 708, 720, 168 E.R. 455, 461 (Ex 1796).
33. See e.g., Owsley v. Cunningham, 190 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Va. 1961); Mont-
gomery v. United States, 146 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1944).
34. Compare J. Brennan's remark in Ashe concerning rejection by the Supreme
Court of the same evidence rule: 397 U.S. 436, at 452-53 (citing In re Nielson, 131
U.S. 176 (1889) ).
35. See e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); also see Loyola Chi.
L.J. 98, at 108 (1970); Whether this is because of the federal rule of collateral estop-
pel or because of Justice Department policy is unclear. See the Attorney General's
remarks concerning successive state-federal prosecutions after Abbatte v. United States,
359 U.S. 187 (1959) at 27 U.S.L.W. 2509 (1959).
36. 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
37. 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923).
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Is that [state action] a hardship so acute and shocking that our
polity will not endure it? Does it violate those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civi-
lized institutions?38
This concept was the motivating force of the Court when it affirmed
New Jersey's successive prosecutions in Hoag, and stated that the states
should have the widest latitude in the administration of their own sys-
tems of criminal justice. As long as the states were consistent in their
application or nonapplication of their own rule of collateral estoppel,
the Supreme Court, using the fundamental fairness interpretation of
due process, did not attempt to interfere.39 Apparently the doctrine of
collateral estoppel was not considered a factor in determining whether
"fundamental fairness" had been violated.
Now, however, fundamental fairness and the due process clause are
not the only standards to which the states must adhere regarding the
question of double jeopardy.40 The decision in Ashe will result in a
more uniform handling of double jeopardy problems with the federal
standards constituting the lowest level of protection offered to a defend-
ant in criminal cases.41  The Supreme Court will be free "to make
certain that [those] principles have been constitutionally applied . ..
[and will not hesitate] to make an independent examination of the
whole record"4 in its determination of compliance with the rule of col-
lateral estoppel by state courts.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: DIFFICULTIES AND DEFICIENCIES
IN IMPLEMENTATION
The basic function of collateral estoppel is to prevent litigation at a
second criminal prosecution of issues previously determined in favor of
a defendant. The Court's opinion in Ashe explains that this determi-
nation can be made by finding whether the jury could have rationally
grounded its verdict only on the issue which a defendant seeks to pre-
clude from further litigation. This test, then, generally is effective only
where a single issue is seriously contested in the first trial. A defend-
ant in a multiple issue trial who wishes to avail himself of collateral
estoppel in future trials is put in an unfavorable position in the first
38. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
39. See n. 28 supra.
40. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
41. States could undoubtedly adopt stricter standards; see State v. Cormier, 46 N.J.
494, 218 A.2d 138 (1966), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court disassociated itself
with the state level decision in Hoag.
42. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 at 285 (1964).
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prosecution: in order to be sure the doctrine of collateral estoppel will
apply in a subsequent prosecution he must limit his defenses to one es-
sential issue. Such a tactic may deprive him of other issues with which
he might defend himself.
Of course, the defendant might be able to avoid such a course of ac-
tion by trying all issues and requesting a special verdict or special in-
terrogatories. These possible solutions, however, would only create
additional problems. Instituting special verdicts would deprive a de-
fendant of any possibility of jury irrationality growing out of public
sentiment, and it has been suggested that it might even conflict with
the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury.43
The Supreme Court in Ashe, however, has not stipulated that there
must be only one contested issue in a trial for collateral estoppel to ap-
ply. It is not impossible to conceive of a multiple issue trial where it
could be determined from the record, pleadings, and charge, on what
issue the jury had rationally based its verdict. The Court's opinion,
however, leaves unresolved a number of problems in the implementa-
tion of the collateral estoppel doctrine in multiple issue trials. First,
the Court does not enunciate what standards should be used to isolate
the issue necessarily determined by the jury. Second, it is unclear
whether judges themselves must evaluate the credibility of evidence of-
fered and thus become triers-of-fact after a verdict has been rendered.
Third, even assuming there was only one contested issue, it is also un-
clear how or even if, the courts should take into account the possibility
of jury irrationality. 4  Justice Burger pointed out these difficulties in
his dissent, concluding that: "The Court bases its holding on sheer
guesswork which should have no place. . . in our review of state con-
victions by way of habeas corpus. '45
Even in a situation where collateral estoppel is clearly applicable, a
court is faced with the problem of deciding where to draw the line in
categorizing 'facts' determined by the verdict. A defendant might claim
that he contested but one issue, and that not only is that issue precluded
43. See Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 Har. L.R. 1 (1960).
Another possibility, questioning the jury after the trial as the "rational" basis of their
verdict, would conflict with the well established policy against exploring the jury's
mental processes, and probably would be unreliable in any event.
44. The Court's opinion in Hoag alluded to the potential for jury irrationality
when it referred to the case of Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932). The Court
in Dunn held that a defendant may not make use of an inconsistency between verdicts
returned on several counts of an indictment in order to secure a reversal of his con-
viction, because there was always a possibility that the jury may have exercised its
prerogative of irrationality.
45. 397 U.S. at 468.
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from further litigation, but so also are all matters which were presented
to support his defense. What is to be done with these "mediate" as
opposed to "ultimate" facts? The Court in Ashe gives no hint as to
the existence of the problem, much less a solution. However, the mat-
ter has been touched upon by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Kramer.4" That court held that collateral estoppel ap-
plies "when it is evident from the pleadings and the record that deter-
mination of the fact in question was necessary to the final judgment, and
it was foreseeable that the fact would be of importance in possible fu-
ture litigation. '4 7  This is somewhat more precise than the formula-
tion of the Supreme Court as expressed in Yates v. United States, 48
which calls for preclusion of questions of fact, as well as questions of
mixed fact and law that were essential to the decision in the first case.
Yet neither of these expressions are all-inclusive. An area not covered
by these formulations exists, for example, where a defendant contests
one single issue, and brings to bear three separate pieces of evidence to
support his defense. If the defendant is acquitted, the issue he con-
tested will be the rational basis on which the jury based its verdict. Yet
one or more of the supporting facts was certainly essential to the final
judgment, and perhaps should also be precluded from further litiga-
tion. But how would a court decide which of these "mediate" facts
had been determined in favor of the defendant? The decision in Ashe
gives no indication as to how this problem should be handled.
Another difficulty with collateral estoppel in criminal cases concerns
the concept of mutuality. In civil cases a reciprocity exists between
the parties to the suit to the extent that a fact determination can work
either for or against any party. Collateral estoppel is, in effect, a two
edged sword in civil cases. Is this mutuality theory to be carried into
criminal prosecutions? Consistency with the doctrine as applied in the
civil courts would seem to answer in the affirmative, but at least one
federal court, that in United States v. DeAngelo, clearly stated it will
not:
Nor can there be any requirement of mutuality with respect to a
criminal judgment's conclusiveness. An accused is entitled to a
trial de novo of the facts alleged and offered in support of each of-
fense charged against him. 49
46. See n. 24 supra.
47. Id. at 917.
48. 354 U.S. 298 at 336.
49. United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466, at 468.
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Further, the majority opinion in Ashe implied that it saw no problem
with such a question, stating that:
As a rule of federal law, therefore, it is much too late to suggest
that this principle [collateral estoppel] is not fully applicable to a
former judgment in a criminal case, because of lack of 'mutuality'
50
Assuming, however, that collateral estoppel can be implemented ef-
fectively in criminal cases, will the prosecution be put at too great a dis-
advantage? Certainly the doctrine will create additional difficulties for
the state in its legitimate end of enforcing criminal statutes. Today it is
impossible in a criminal prosecution for the state to appeal what it con-
siders to be an erroneous decision at the trial level, except where the
trial judge makes a substantive error of law."' Placed in such a dis-
advantageous position, prosecutors have contended that marginal ju-
dicial decisions tend to favor a defendant simply because judges know
that these decisions cannot be reviewed on appeal.52 If one concedes
some measure of validity to this argument, it is apparent that incorporat-
ing the doctrine of collateral estoppel into the Double Jeopardy Clause
further decreases a prosecutor's chances of securing a conviction when
he feels error has occurred. Since the state has an interest in enforcing
its criminal statutes on behalf of the people as a whole, another ques-
tion raised by the Ashe decision concerns to how great a disadvantage the
state should be put, in the interest of expanding the protection of indi-
viduals' rights." It is conceded that states still do have the deterrent
of multiple-count indictments at one trial, and the possibility of con-
secutive sentencing. Nevertheless, it is at least to be kept in mind that
the rule of Ashe will somewhat impede the states in their protection of
the people through enforcement of its criminal statutes.
Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel is a further impediment
to the prosecution, there is the possibility that it will have only a limited
application. First, it seems improbable that a large number of defense
attorneys in multiple issue trials will be willing to contest just one issue
in the hope of invoking the doctrine in a subsequent prosecution. Sec-
50. 397 U.S. at 443.
51. It has been suggested that there is really no constitutional requirement that the
state be denied recourse to appeal. When a defendant wins an appeal for a new trial
on grounds of error, the new trial is considered an extension of the original prosecu-
tion, and thus no double jeopardy problem is presented. The same reasoning could
apply to appeals by the prosecution. However, it seems safe to assume that at this
stage of constitutional interpretation a reversal of this limitation on the states' prose-
cutorial powers is unlikely to occur.
52. See Bis Vexari, 74 Har. L.R. 1, at 5, n. 21.
53. It seems that the use of collateral estoppel should be disallowed at least where
the jury verdict is plainly irrational.
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ond, it is possible that the issue determined by a jury's verdict will not
be essential to subsequent trials. 5" Finally, and perhaps most obviously,
collateral estoppel is of no use to a defendant who, though he might
find himself in circumstances identical to those of Ashe, is unfortunate
enough to be convicted at the first trial. Such a defendant is afforded
no protection from a prosecutor who is determined to string out a suc-
cession of trials until he is satisfied with the penalty handed down. 5
What is even more disturbing is the fact that such prosecutions them-
selves might be purposely employed as a means of punishment through
humiliation, expense and anxiety. 58
It is apparent, then, that collateral estoppel is severely inadequate in a
number of situations. The question remains as to what rule of law, if
any, would be efficacious in those circumstances where collateral es-
toppel does not apply.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: CHANCES FOR EXTENSION
OR SUPPLEMENTATION
Whenever possible the Supreme Court will not "formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which
it is to be applied."5 7 The Court in Ashe was able to reverse the peti-
tioner's second conviction by employing collateral estoppel, so it is not
surprising that the opinion of the court did not discuss the inadequacies
of the doctrine as applied to differing situations. Mr. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas, voiced sharp concern over the
gaps collateral estoppel would leave in an individual's protection against
double jeopardy. Citing Green v. United States,"' Mr. Justice Brennan
emphasized the point that the Double Jeopardy Clause is designed to pre-
vent the "harassment and vexation" arising from successive prosecutions
as well as any convictions which might take place after the first trial.
Manifestly, then, in a single issue trial where it could be determined
that the jury exercised its prerogative of irrationality; where there are
multiple issues which the defendant must litigate; where the issue de-
54. This problem can be illustrated by the example of an alleged robber who con-
tests only the issue of a victim's losses at the first trial. An acquittal would preclude
relitigating that issue, but subsequent prosecutions based on the robbery of other vic-
tims would not be barred by collateral estoppel.
55. The prosecutor in the Ciucci case (see n. 36 supra) in an interview with a
Chicago Daily News reporter announced his intention (prior to the first trial) of initi-
ating three trials if necessary to secure the death penalty for the defendant.
56. Further, it is possible that such a situation might constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.
57. See J. Brandeis's opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
58. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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termined is not vital to a subsequent trial; or where the first trial results
in a conviction; a defendant may be subjected to such harassment and
vexation. Mr. Justice Brennan further suggests that the only justifica-
tion behind such successive trials is that of affording the state addi-
tional opportunities for convictions, which would not be needed if the
first prosecution were handled competently. The defendant does not
enjoy the privilege of an opportunity to reverse a previous valid convic-
tion, yet the state in effect has this chance as against the defendant's
previous valid acquittal. The fact that the state cannot appeal a judg-
ment may provide some basis for arguing that the prosecution should
have more than one opportunity to convict; nevertheless, the policy be-
hind such an argument, that of enforcement of criminal statutes, should
fall before the more important consideration of freedom from undue
governmental harassment.
Since it seems apparent that collateral estoppel as employed by the
majority opinion in Ashe does not effectively prevent the abuses of
harassment, the solution is to expand or supplement the doctrine. In-
stituting special verdicts or post-trial questioning has already been sug-
tested,5 9 but even should they prove practicable they would be of no
use where the issue precluded is not vital, or where there has been a con-
viction. Another answer might be to allow judges at the trial level un-
limited discretion in determining the rational basis of a jury's verdict, so
long as such discretion is exercised only in favor of the defendant. This
would probably result in a great lack of uniformity and conjecture,
however, and would prove useless in the same situations where special
verdicts and post-trial questioning are ineffective. Further, situations
would undoubtedly arise where, even with unlimited discretion, a judge
could not decide what issue had been determined. Also, it is certainly
arguable that where a jury verdict is plainly irrational, a judge should
not have the discretion to apply the rule of collateral estoppel.
A more practicable alternative would be the "one transaction rule"
as espoused by Mr. Justice Brennan in Ashe. This rule would call for
joinder at one trial of all charges arising out of the same transaction,
episode or occurrence. Charges not so joined would be barred from
future prosecutions."0 The trial judge would have the discretion to
sever those charges, however, if it appeared that it would prejudice the
defendant not to do so. At least in this manner the question is a ju-
59. See pg. 192 supra.
60. With certain exceptions, e.g., where a crime is not completed or discovered
until after commencement of the first trial.
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dicial rather than prosecutorial one, and the defendant will have ac-
cess to the appellate process.
Some states already have enacted statutes which resemble Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan's one transaction rule." Further, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure liberally encourage joinder of charges.62 But per-
haps the most lucid formulation of this supplemental aid to collateral
estoppel is that suggested by the ALI Model Penal Code, which pro-
vides for joinder of known charges where:
the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions motivated by
a common sense purpose or plan and which result in the repeated
commission of the same offense or affect the same person or the
same persons or the property thereof.63
This provision would provide defendants with maximum protection
from the abuses of successive prosecutions, yet still allow the state to
split an occurrence into separate offenses for the purpose of multiple-
count indictments and consecutive sentencing.64 Criminal defendants
would thus be afforded greater benefits from the Double Jeopardy
Clause, while there would not be an acute lessening of the state's ability
to enforce criminal statutes.
CONCLUSION
In a traditional manner, the Court disposed of the question in Ashe
by means of a decision combining effectiveness and restraint. Ex-
pressly incorporating collateral estoppel into the Double Jeopardy
Clause was all that was required to reverse Ashe's conviction; the Court
did not attempt to redress future wrongs of a differing but related na-
ture. But the spirit behind the Ashe decision is unmistakeably similar
to that of Green v. United States, 5 where the Court held that no crimi-
nal defendant should have to run the gantlet more than once. The
Ashe Court found itself concerned with the danger of convictions re-
sulting from successive trials after an initial acquittal, and declared
61. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 §§ 3-3, 3-4(b)(1), (1967). To assume that
because of the existence of this statute Ashe v. Swenson imposes no additional restric-
tions on the criminal procedural law of Illinois would be a mistake. In People v.
Johnson, 44 Ill. 2d 463, 256 N.E.2d 343 (1970), where three accused persons broke into
the victim's apartment and after taking her money, raped her, consecutive trials for
burglary and rape were held valid. Under Ashe if the defendant was acquitted in the
first trial and if the court determined the only issue in that rape trial was whether the
accused was one of the three participants in the crimes, the burglary trial would be
precluded.
62. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rules 8, 13, 14, and 18.
63. ALI Model Penal Code § 1.08(2), Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956.
64. It would also greatly serve the purpose of judicial economy.
65. See n. 58 supra.
Vol. 2: 183
Case Comments
that such a danger ran against the very essence of the Fifth Amendment.
If an appropriate case presents itself, it is submitted that the Court will
adopt something similar to the "one transaction rule" formulated by
Mr. Justice Brennan. 66 To predict otherwise would be to conclude that
the Court considers a defendant in need of protection from successive
related prosecutions only in the situation where the first trial results in
an acquittal based on a clearly contested issue, and that any and all
other situations are outside the sphere of protection. Creating such a
distinction in the application of Fifth Amendment guarantees belies the
very policy considerations which played such a large part in the Ashe
decision. It seems much more cogent to argue that Ashe is merely
an intermediate step towards a more comprehensive goal of guaran-
teeing:
[T]hat the State with all its resources and power [shall] not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense,
and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anx-
iety and insecurity. 67
WILLIAM H. POKORNY, JR.
66. Justices Burger and Harlan were the only members of the Court to voice dis-
approval of the rule. Justice Black concurred emphatically with the majority opinion
on collateral estoppel. It seems safe to suggest that Justice Black, as well as Justices
Stewart and White (the majority opinion) would tend to agree with Justice Brennan
rather than Chief Justice Burger regarding the one transaction rule.
67. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, at 187 (1957); cited by J. Brennan
in his concurring opinion in Ashe, 397 U.S. at 450.
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